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The Queensland Rifle Association (QRA), founded in 1861, supported the nascent Queensland Volunteers. The Volunteers 
papered over Queensland’s defence deficiencies, a task made easier by the lack of a credible threat to the colony. While external 
but illusory threats were made real, more substantial internal threats were made illusory. The key was Britain’s opinion. A 
tyranny of precedence exercised formidable power over the Australian colonists. This was glaringly apparent in Australia’s 
frontier wars. Newspapers and government records detail the Europeans killed during Australia’s frontier wars, not the 
Indigenous deaths. Illusion undermines the frontier war’s historical reality. The Volunteers and the QRA never participated 
in the frontier war, but analysing their objections to the conflict restates the frontier war as factual, and conducted with 
government knowledge.
Throughout the nineteenth century, British imperialism absorbed passing “theories” like Social Dar-winism to justify the dispossession of Indigenous lands. Dazzling with the sheen of the modern, 
such theories merely mirrored colonial vanity. The game was to divert attention from the land grab of 
a whole continent.
	 A	significant	part	of	the	diversion	in	colonial	Queensland	involved	defence.	As	in	the	other	colonies,	
illusory, external threats to the new colony were made real, while more substantial internal threats were made 
illusory,	or	significantly	downplayed.	The	key	was	Britain’s	opinion.	If	Britannia	thought	the	Russians	were	
coming, so did Queensland. If London considered that the French were planning to invade, Queensland needed 
to	be	wary.	Britain’s	opinion	mattered	more	than	local	assessment,	more	than	public	opinion,	more	than	reality.	
Beside the tyranny of distance, a tyranny of precedence exercised a decisive power. This was glaringly apparent 
in the frontier wars. In 1863, the Colonial Secretary in London informed the Australian colonies that they were 
‘free	from	formidable	native	tribes.’1	This	contrasted	with	Britain	fighting	fierce	Maori	in	New	Zealand	and	
war-like	Zulus	in	South	Africa.	Without	a	British	declaration	of	war	in	Queensland,	local	officials	avoided	the	
term	‘war.’	Colonial	subservience	is	therefore	one	reason	why	an	illusion	of	peaceful	settlement	took	hold.
 Another reason was that there appeared to be relatively few deaths. A rough estimate of 
Europeans	killed	during	Australia’s	 frontier	wars	can	be	gleaned	from	newspapers	and	government 
1. Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor Bowen (Queensland Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedings, 2 Part 1 Session, 
1863), 695.
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records.1 Not the Indigenous deaths. They are the unnamed, the unnumbered, the dishonoured; their 
remains lie scattered, burned, hidden. In the very unlikely event of the Indigenous death tally being 
a	fifth	of	an	estimated	20,000,	the	4,000	would	be	greater	than	the	combined	Australian	death	tolls	in	
the	Boer,	Korean,	Vietnam,	Gulf,	and	Iraq	Wars.	Research	into	the	frontier	war	therefore	has	an	added	
burden beyond historical analysis—the burden of showing how the force of illusion has undermined 
the	frontier	war’s	historical	reality.
	 Since	 the	 Second	World	War,	 Indigenous	 and	 non-Indigenous	 historians,	 archaeologists	 and	
anthropologists	have	re-contextualised	frontier	conflict.	An	earlier	orthodoxy	had	Eurocentric	civilisation	
conquering Antipodean savagery, superior technology triumphant over Stone Age implements. Revised 
understandings pit numerically superior colonists against Aboriginal communities decimated by 
European	diseases.	Among	many	works,	Clive	Turnbull’s	Black War,2	Henry	Reynolds’	The Other Side of 
the Frontier,3 Raymond	Evans’	Race Relations in Colonial Queensland,4	Jonathon	Richards’	The Secret War,5 
and	Marcia	Langton	and	Gordon	Briscoe’s	commentary	in	the	2008 television series, The First Australians, 
reassert the vigour, and the cost, of Aboriginal resistance.6	Dissenting	views,	like	Keith	Windschuttle’s	
The Fabrication of Aboriginal History,7	significantly	reduce	estimates	of	Indigenous	deaths	on	the	frontier.	
By	 ignoring	Aboriginal	 oral	 evidence,	 and	 relying	 solely	on	written	 archival	material,	Windschuttle	
disputes the likelihood of unrecorded murders of Aboriginal people by settlers or authorities.
	 The	early	colonial	Queensland	Rifle	Association	(QRA)	and	the	Queensland	Volunteers	augment	
our knowledge of the frontier war and reassert its social reality. Until this research, historians have 
not commented on the suggestion that Queensland Volunteers serve on the frontier. The suggestion 
provides a measure of the anxiety that Aboriginal resistance created in colonial Queensland. In 1860, 
William	Thornton,	MLC,	 thought	Queensland’s	 frontier	conflict	hardly	rated	with	 the	New	Zealand	
Wars;	by	1865,	Governor	Bowen	considered	the	two	conflicts	presented	similar	dangers	to	settlers.	This	
study	reaffirms	the	conclusions	of	Evans	and	Richards	in	their	works	above:	that	the	Queensland	Parlia-
ment, despite being aware of the consequences, allowed state-sponsored frontier violence to continue.
 In late June 1860, the Queensland Parliament announced a select committee inquiry into the new 
colony’s	Native	Police	force.8 The following month, Parliament proposed £3000 for arms for the new 
Queensland Volunteers.9	At	that	time,	the	volunteers	were	the	colony’s	sole	defence	force.	When	the	
Second	New	Zealand	War	had	broken	out,	Britain	shipped	most	of	the	remaining	Imperial	troops	in	
Australia across the Tasman. Queensland felt ‘particularly vulnerable as it lacked an Imperial garrison 
and	a	volunteer	corps.’10	In	early	September	1860,	Governor	Bowen	appointed	Lt-Col.	Maurice	O’Connell	
as	Commandant	of	the	Volunteer	Rifle	Brigade.11	Within	days	the	Courier published a letter from “Rough 
Reality,”	a	working-class	critic	of	the	volunteers.	‘This	Jimcrack	movement	won’t	do,’	warned	“Rough	
Reality,”	‘this	move	to	save	the	waste	lands	and	waste	the	people	of	the	land.’12 “Rough Reality” assumed 
volunteers on the frontier would shoot (waste) Aborigines. He had linked the volunteers, the Native 
Police and the Aborigines to the land issue. 
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 “A Volunteer” took “Rough Reality” to task. There were ‘sixty or seventy stalwart lads at drill, 
all of whom are working men—any of whom I would back to give “Rough Reality” the best thrashing 
he	ever	had	in	his	life,	and	who	mean	to	give	any	foreign	aggressor	a	similar	entertainment	…’	“Rough	
Reality”	had	‘base	cowardly	doctrines,’	‘enough	to	make	an	honest	Englishman	sick!’	“Rough	Reality”	
was	a	‘traitor,’	‘a	downright	poltroon,’	trying	to	‘mask	his	cowardice	by	a	very	silly	attempt	to	connect	
the	volunteer	movement	with	the	land	question.’	For	good	measure,	“A	Volunteer”	added	that	“Rough	
Reality”	was	‘a	barefaced	impostor’	and	a	‘mean	spirited	wretch.’13
	 Despite	the	protests,	“Rough	Reality”	was	not	the	first	to	connect	the	volunteers	to	the	frontier	
war.	A	volunteers’	meeting	in	Ipswich	had	done	the	same:	‘Paradoxical	as	it	may	appear,	we	believe	that	
more blacks and whites have perished in these districts from bad shooting than from good. Emboldened 
by	the	harmlessness	of	firearms	in	the	hands	of	many	of	the	whites,	 their	[the	Aborigines’]	audacity	
increased,	and	natives	who	would	have	run	away	at	the	report	of	a	fowling-piece	soon	acquired	sufficient	
pluck	to	become	assailants.’14 Better shooting would therefore kill more Aborigines, and supposedly 
deter Aboriginal reprisals.
 The volunteer issue interested many Brisbanites, churchmen included. Presbyterian minis-
ter	Charles	Ogg	also	suggested	Volunteers	serve	on	 the	 frontier.	Wrote	Rev.	Ogg,	 ‘The	aborigines	of	
Queensland	 are	 at	 the	 bottom	of	 the	 scale	 of	 human	beings	…	 in	 a	 state	 of	 unbroken	barbarity	…’	
Having warmed to his topic, Ogg proposed ‘every man capable of bearing arms in the bush ought to 
be	enrolled,’	that	the	‘home	government	[lend]	us	a	few	companies	of	riflemen,	who	could	be	scattered	
along	the	coast,’	and	that	Native	Police	and	volunteers	show,	‘by	a	display	of	strength,	that	it	is	useless	
for	 them	[Aborigines]	 to	 think	of	escape	when	 they	have	perpetrated	 their	deeds	of	darkness.’	That	
his	“cure”	might	worsen	the	situation,	or	that	the	colonists’	“displays	of	strength”	and	armed	reprisals	
might	also	be	“deeds	of	darkness,”	were	tragic	ironies	outside	Ogg’s	scope.	
	 Ogg	 saw	 danger	 on	 every	 hand:	 ‘foreign	 foes’	 would	 ‘make	 use	 of	 the	 blacks,’	 an	 educated	
Aborigine	would	use	a	rifle	‘for	the	destruction	of	his	benefactor,’	with	the	result	that	‘civilization	would	
be	hemmed	in	between	two	foes.’	He	advised	colonists	to	‘let	the	state	of	matters	in	New	Zealand	teach	
us a lesson … I know one station which was guarded by one good shot, whose duty it was to keep riding 
round the boundaries of the run, and were all stations to have a few volunteers enrolled for this special 
duty	…	the	interior	could	be	kept	in	perfect	safety	until	the	return	of	the	police	…’15 For Ogg, the cost of 
freedom was constant vigilantes.
 The Rev. J. D. Lang went a step further than Ogg, and rationalised the violence. At a January 1856 
meeting	of	Brisbane’s	Friends	of	the	Aborigines,	Lang	said	that	colonists	were	‘certainly	debtors’	to	the	
first	Australians,	since	colonists	‘had	seized	upon	their	land	and	confiscated	their	territory.’	In	doing	
that, he did not think they had done anything wrong. ‘God in making the earth never intended it should 
be	occupied	by	men	so	incapable	of	appreciating	its	resources	as	the	aborigines	of	Australia.’16	Lang’s	
comment	made	the	Aborigines’	“Friends”	indistinguishable	from	their	enemies.
	 Another	Friend	of	the	Aborigines	was	Congregational	minister	Rev.	J.	W.	C.	Drane.	Unlike	Lang,	
he condemned, not condoned. He deplored the Guardian’s	call	on	6	November	1861	to	‘hunt	down	and	
shoot	the	blacks.’	Drane’s	adversary	was	the	Guardian’s	editor,	Dr.	William	Hobbs,	Governor	Bowen’s	
physician	and	‘a	social	Darwinist’	who	had	‘devoted	a	series	of	long	editorials	to	the	Aborigines	in	an	
attempt	to	establish	their	inferiority	before	the	law.’	Hobbs	presented	a	view,	‘popular	among	Queensland	
squatters, that no white man who shot an Aborigine, in self-defence or in sport, should be exposed to 
trial	or	sentence.’17 The Guardian wanted revenge for the Nogoa massacre where Aborigines murdered 
13.  The Moreton Bay Courier, 8 September 1860: 6.
14.	 	Northern Australian, as per The Moreton Bay Courier, 3 August 1859: 2.
15.  The Moreton Bay Courier,	6	August	1860:	4,	and	quoted	in	Raymond	Evans,	“‘Wanton	Outrage’:	Police	and	Aborigines	at	Break-
fast Creek 1860,” in Brisbane: Aboriginal Alien Ethnic (Brisbane: Brisbane History Group Papers No. 5, 1987), 35.
16.  Rev. J. D. Lang to the Friends of the Aborigines (Brisbane: The Moreton Bay Courier, 19 January 1856), 3.
17.  Queensland Guardian,	14	and	21	February	1861,	as	quoted	in	Denis	Cryle,	The Press in Colonial Queensland: A Social and Political 
History 1845–1875 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1989), 67.
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nineteen	colonists,	 including	cricketer	Tom	Wills’	 father.	Rev.	Drane	 responded,	 ‘The	blacks	have	as	
much right to live here as ourselves and justice is as much their claim as ours … though degraded and 
uncivilized they have a right to be treated as men and women … God is no respecter of persons; neither 
ought	British	law	to	be,	as	applied	to	the	Aborigines	around	us.’18 For nineteenth-century colonists it 
was easier to protest against violence than to see that Aborigines were already civilised.
 The Courier had been strenuously campaigning for government to replace the ‘wretched abortion 
now	honoured	by	the	appellation	of	the	“Native	Police	Corps”.’	Queensland	had	inherited	the	Native	
Police	on	separation	from	New	South	Wales.	The	Courier proclaimed that the question was ‘whether an 
effective organisation cannot be formed irrespective of the blacks altogether; whether a border force of 
whites cannot be constituted which would be no more expensive to the country and far more effective 
in	its	operation	…’19	Letters	from	squatters	and	‘One	who	has	seen	too	much	of	the	Native	Police’	hoped	
that a ‘European Force could be established of a far more reliable and effective character than the one 
now	cherished.’20
 Rightly or wrongly, the perception grew that volunteers might patrol the frontier, and during the 
May	1861	Inquiry,	Maurice	O’Connell	faced	specific	questions	about	volunteers	and	civilians	working	
with the Native Police.21 An alternative view was that volunteers might replace the Native Police if the 
Inquiry abolished the force. Either way, the recently formed adjunct of the volunteers, the QRA, could 
train	marksmen	for	the	frontier.	The	QRA	had	two	stated	purposes:	it	would	encourage	‘rifle	practise	
throughout	the	colony,’	and	it	would	support	the	military	volunteer	movement.22
 Ironically, the Brisbane Volunteers thought war with the Aborigines would amount to little. At the 
volunteers’	first	meeting,	William	Thornton,	MLC,	had	said	‘he	certainly	did	not	expect	the	aborigines	
of	Queensland	would	ever	make	such	a	 stand	as	 the	New	Zealanders	 could	do	…’23 Most colonists 
agreed, and this smug assessment of Aboriginal resistance explains the increasing despair and hostility 
as the frontier war escalated.
	 Five	 years	 later,	 in	 1865,	Governor	Bowen	bewailed	 ‘Queensland’s	warlike	Aborigines.’24 The 
following year, he stated, ‘I would require at least 10,000 Imperial troops to control 2,000 Aboriginal 
warriors.’25	In	a	letter	to	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Colonies,	Bowen	included	a	briefing	note	that	compared	
Queensland’s	situation	to	New	Zealand.	Prepared	by	A.	W.	Manning,	Clerk	of	the	Legislative	Assembly,	
the note made two points. Firstly, ‘The hostile aborigines in the interior of Queensland are more numerous 
in	most	points	in	proportion	to	the	few	scattered	settlers	than	are	the	Maoris	[sic]	in	proportion	to	the	
British	population	of	New	Zealand.’	Secondly,	‘The	entire	cost	of	the	Mounted	Native	Police	(a	force	
somewhat resembling the Cape mounted police) and of the internal defence of Queensland generally, is 
borne	by	the	colonists,	who	do	for	themselves	what	has	always	been	done	chiefly	by	the	mother	country	
in	the	two	other	colonies	(the	Cape	and	New	Zealand)	where	the	aborigines	are	numerous	and	hostile.’26 
Bowen’s	pleas	to	London	went	unheeded.	Whitehall	had	already	dispatched	‘a	force	of	10,000	imperial	
troops’	to	fight	the	‘insurgent	Maori	[sic].’27
	 In	1863,	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Colonies	had	informed	Bowen,	‘Responsible	government	[means]	
that the Imperial Government has no further responsibility for maintaining the internal tranquillity of 
18.  The Courier,	14	November	1861:	5.
19.  The Moreton Bay Courier, 16 April 1861: 5.
20.  The Moreton Bay Courier, 2 April 1861: 3.
21.	 	Select	committee	on	the	Native	Police	Force	(Queensland	Legislative	Assembly,	Votes	and	Proceedings,	1861),	488–491.
22.  The Courier, 16 May 1861: 2.
23.  The Moreton Bay Courier, 15 March 1860: 2.
24.	 	Qld.	Despatch	series	1,	no.	30,	vol.	1,	Bowen	to	Secretary	of	State	for	Colonies,	18/5/1865	and	enclosure:	minutes	of	meeting	
of Executive Council, 10 May 1865, 165.
25.	 	Bowen	to	Lord	Carnarvon,	12	November	1866	(CO	234/16,	S7333,	PRO)	as	quoted	in	Raymond	Evans,	Fighting Words: Writing 
About Race (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1999), 39.
26.	 	A.	W.	Manning,	Clerk	of	the	Legislative	Council,	to	Governor	Bowen,	for	attention	of	Secretary	of	State	for	Colonies,	Queen-
sland (Queensland Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedings Part 1, 1866), 759.
27.  Raymond Evans, A History of Queensland (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 95.
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the country … Its obligations towards the defence of the Colonies … is limited to the contingency of war 
and	the	danger	of	war.’28 In the absence of a formal declaration of hostilities, and without the requested 
Redcoats	 from	Mother	England,	Queensland’s	government	allowed	settlers	and	the	Native	Police	 to	
forge	their	own	ways	of	‘maintaining	the	internal	tranquillity.’
	 By	1874,	the	Courier	was	lamenting	the	‘guerilla	war’	that	‘no	one	attempts	to	justify	…	on	legal	
grounds.	There	is	no	legality	in	it	…	we	are	always	fighting	with	the	blacks	on	the	frontier	and	they	with	
us	…	In	this	frontier	war—for	that	it	really	is	…	[a]	native	police	officer	must	be	a	law	to	himself,	the	
rifles	and	carbines	of	his	men	being	his	executioners.’29
 Before, during, and after the 1861 Inquiry, there were numerous formal, informal or social links 
between	 the	 volunteers,	 QRA	 members	 and	 the	 Native	 Police.	 Maurice	 O’Connell	 was	 President	
of	 the	new	Rifle	Association;	 its	 patron	was	Governor	Bowen.	 Some	Native	Police	 officers	 received	
supernumerary ranks in the volunteers. The recipients included the current Native Police Commandant, 
Edric Morrisett,30	and	Lt.	John	O’Connell	Bligh,	a	future	Commandant.31	Bligh	was	Maurice	O’Connell’s	
cousin.	 Maurice	 O’Connell	 figured	 prominently	 in	 other	 connections	 to	 the	 Native	 Police.	 While	
Commissioner of Lands at Port Curtis (Gladstone), he supervised a Native Police detachment for four 
years,	and	he	testified	in	two	Parliamentary	Inquiries	into	the	Native	Police	(1858	and	1861).
	 In	1858,	O’Connell	supported	Frederick	Walker,	the	former	Native	Police	Commandant.	According	
to	O’Connell,	Walker	‘had	worked	a	change	and	improvement	in	the	aborigines	[the	Aboriginal	troopers]	
I	was	hardly	prepared	to	think	they	were	capable	of.’32	Walker	had	been	sacked	for	drunkenness.	He	
poached several Native Police troopers and the Courier reported that he ‘had been employed by some 
squatters	 to	 organise	 a	 sort	 of	 guerilla	 force	 at	 their	 expense	 to	wage	warfare	 against	 the	 blacks.’33 
His	business	flourished	until	 the	New	South	Wales	government	 complained.	O’Connell’s	 testimony	
accelerated	Walker’s	rehabilitation	and	he	was	hired	to	search	for	the	lost	explorers,	Burke	and	Wills.	In	
both	Parliamentary	Inquiries,	O’Connell	argued	that	one	of	the	prime	aims	of	the	Native	Police	was	‘to	
render each individual member of the force as expert in the use of the weapons entrusted to him as he 
is	capable	of	becoming.’34	The	QRA’s	objective	was	strikingly	similar.
	 O’Connell,	 as	President	 of	 the	Acclimatisation	 Society,	 accepted	plant	 specimens	 from	Native	
Police	officer	Lt.	Frederick	Wheeler.35	Wheeler	was	stationed	at	Port	Curtis	when	O’Connell	supervised	
the Native Police contingent. Contemporary accounts,36 as well as recent publications like Jonathon 
Richards’	Secret War,37	 paint	Wheeler	 as	 a	barbaric	murderer.	He	 is	held	 responsible	 for	 Indigenous	
deaths at Fassifern, a massacre at Caboolture, and in 1876, the murder of an Aboriginal boy at Banchory 
station,	Clermont.	While	on	bail,	he	absconded,	and	died	in	Java	in	1882.	Bail	was	supposedly	provided	
by the presiding judge, and QRA Vice-President, Justice Alfred Lutwyche.38
	 Until	the	Native	Police’s	abolition	in	1910,	former	or	future	Native	Police	officers	joined	rifle	clubs,	
competed	in	QRA	competitions,	won	prizes	and	helped	administrate	rifle	shooting	in	Queensland.	The	
most	notable	was	George	P.	M.	Murray,	Brisbane’s	Police	Magistrate	in	the	late	1890s.	Murray,	a	Native	
Police	officer	from	1857	to	1866,	joined	the	first	Wide	Bay	Rifle	Club	as	early	as	1858,	and	was	a	leading	
figure	in	the	Queensland	Scottish	Rifle	Club.39
28.  Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor Bowen, 695.
29.  The Brisbane Courier,	5	November	1874:	2.
30.  The Moreton Bay Courier, 6 March 1860: 2.
31.  The Courier, 23 September 1861: 2.
32.  Select committee on the murders by the Aborigines on the Dawson River (NSW	Legislative	Assembly,	Votes	and	Proceedings	
vol. 2 no. 2, 1858), 853.
33.  The Courier, 25 July 1861: 2.
34.	 	Select	committee	on	the	murders	by	the	Aborigines	on	the	Dawson	River,	861.
35.  The Brisbane Courier,	8	June	1864:	2.
36.  The Courier, 1 September 1862: 2; The Courier,	4	October	1862:	2.
37.  Jonathon Richards, The Secret War: a True History of Queensland’s Native Police (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
2008), 95–96.
38.  Clem Lack and Harry Stafford, The Rifle and the Spear,	(Brisbane:	Fortitude,	1964),	135.
39.  The Brisbane Courier, 16 July 1892: 6.
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 Despite links with the Native Police, there was never any QRA policy to support the Native 
Police, to support the frontier war, or to condone violence of any kind. The QRA had no policies other 
than	encouraging	the	volunteers	and	the	sport	of	rifle-shooting.	However,	the	QRA’s	many	connections	
with the Volunteer Corps, the Native Police and with prominent squatters and Parliamentarians make it 
seem	more	complicit	in	frontier	violence	than	neutral—context	turns	the	QRA’s	silence	into	tacit	acqui-
escence.
 The perception ignores the background of the QRA membership. The colonial QRA contained the 
bulk	of	Brisbane’s	educated,	liberal,	conservative	elite.	These	men	joined	the	volunteers	and	the	rifle	
association out of a strong sense of civic duty. That duty encompassed the rule of English law, which 
they	considered	the	basis	of	civilized	society.	The	reality	was	that	the	QRA	contained	two	of	the	era’s	
most	vocal	opponents	of	the	Native	Police,	Maurice	O’Connell	and	Charles	Lilley.
	 O’Connell	damned	the	management	of	the	Native	Police	in	the	two	Parliamentary	Inquiries.	He	
proposed that its violent excesses be curbed by legislation, training, structural reform, military discipline 
and	recruitment	of	trained	troops,	either	men	from	the	British	cavalry	or	the	Irish	constabulary.	O’Connell	
argued	 strongly	 that	 the	 force	was	 inefficient,	 responsible	 for	 atrocities	 and	 needed	 comprehensive	
reforms. At both inquiries he offered a plan for reconstructing the force. His plan included a military 
band	and	a	budget	of	over	£40,000.40
	 O’Connell’s	 testimony	 resurfaced	 in	 1868	 in	 London’s	Colonial Intelligencer.41 Attributed to ‘a 
correspondent	 in	Queensland,’	 phrases	 echoing	O’Connell’s	 included:	 ‘the	 natives	 are	 employed	 to	
destroy natives, and in a time of peace the work is going on as bravely as if an open war had been 
declared	on	every	black	skin	in	the	colony,’	and	‘if	the	native	police	there	had	been	properly	organised	
for	the	purpose	of	extirpating	aborigines,	they	could	not	accomplish	that	object	more	effectually.’42 The 
article	also	raised	O’Connell’s	doubt	to	the	legality	of	a	force	‘constituted	under	an	Act	of	the	Legislature	
of	NSW,	which	Act,	as	far	as	can	be	ascertained,	has	not	been	re-passed	since	the	separation	of	Qld	from	
the	parent	colony.’43
 Debate continued for decades over the legality of the Native Police, and whether the force was 
separate	from,	or	part	of,	the	regular	Queensland	Police.	In	1884,	the	Police	Commissioner	stated,	‘We	have	
in Queensland a native police force quite separate from the ordinary police, and maintained solely for the 
‘purpose	of	dealing	with	offences	committed	by	the	natives.’44 Historian Raymond Evans noted ‘such an 
accepted	concept	of	distinctiveness’	gave	the	Native	Police	‘an	unspecified	extra-legal	dimension,	which	
the Police Act	did	not	seem	to	encompass.’45	MP	John	Douglas	told	Parliament	in	1880	that	‘The	officers	…	
were	not	justified	under	the	civil	law	in	acting	as	they	did,	and	they	did	not	exercise	that	discretion	which	
military	law	demanded	…’46  Despite such comments, Parliament made no effort to reform the force.
 The constitution of the Native Police is mentioned, though not explained, in the obscure §33 of 
the 1863 Queensland Amendment to Laws relating to Police Force (Qld, 27 Vic No 11, §33 – There shall 
continue to be a Native Police force, etc.). The legality of the general order to disperse was an entirely 
different	matter.	On	at	least	two	occasions,	Lt.	Wheeler	defended	his	actions	by	referring	to	the	general	
order:	‘his	instructions	compel	him	to	disperse	blacks	wherever	they	may	have	congregated,’47 and, ‘It 
is	the	general	order	that	whenever	there	are	large	assemblages	of	blacks,	it	is	the	duty	of	an	officer	to	
disperse	them.’48
40.	 	Select	committee	on	the	Native	Police	Force,	488.
41.	 	Colonial Intelligencer, March 1868, as per The Brisbane Courier, 16 June 1868: 3.
42.	 	Select	committee	on	the	Native	Police	Force,	489.
43.	 	Select	committee	on	the	Native	Police	Force,	488;	The Brisbane Courier, 16 June 1868: 3.
44.	 	D.	T.	Seymour,	to	Govt.	Resident,	Northern	Territory,	4	December	1884:	QSA.	Col/A409,	in	letter	no.	8551	of	1884,	as	quoted	
in Evans, Race Relations, 60.
45.	 	Evans,	Race Relations, 62.
46.	 	QPD,	XXXII	(1880)	669–670,	as	quoted	in	Evans,	Race Relations, 62.
47.	 	The Courier,	4	October	1862:	2.
48.	 	Select	committee	on	the	Native	Police	Force,	17.
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	 The	general	order	originated	prior	to	separation;	Commandant	Edric	Morisset	wrote	it	at	Wide	Bay,	
Queensland, in January 1858. It is among other Native Police regulations included as an appendix to the 
1861	Inquiry.	The	general	order	says	simply,	‘It	is	the	duty	of	the	Officers	at	all	times	and	opportunities	
to	disperse	any	large	assemblage	of	blacks.’49	Who	could	tell	which	legislative	instrument	authorised	
this general order? If the Riot Act, why was it not mentioned in §33? Since the general order had been 
inherited	 from	New	 South	Wales,	 surely	 it	 had	 to	 be	 ratified	 by	 Queensland’s	 Executive	 Council?	
Apparently, it had not.
 Apart from impeding Indigenous trade, the general order effectively outlawed Aboriginal cultural 
practises. No matter the intent of the assembly—corroboree, funeral, initiation ceremony or otherwise—
Aborigines	were	not	to	congregate.	The	general	order	rebutted	officialdom’s	assurances	that	Aborigines	
were British subjects, and opened the door to state sanctioned violence and death for Aboriginal people 
in Queensland.
 The Courier	had	censured	MLCs	Gore	and	Watts	for	‘placing	on	record	the	inimitable	theoretical	
absurdities that the blacks were not British subjects—not entitled to the protection of British law and 
that	they	must	be	treated	as	inhabitants	of	a	country	under	martial	law.’50 The general order, of course, 
was	no	theoretical	absurdity:	 it	was	a	disturbing	reality.	Lt.	Wheeler	agreed	with	the	MLCs,	and	the	
basis	of	his	agreement	was	the	general	order.	He	‘looks	upon	himself	as	a	military	officer	and	the	whole	
of the blacks in the country as under martial law, it is easy to understand how he should coolly tell the 
committee that “there is no other way than surrounding the camps and shooting innocent gins” by 
mistake.’51
	 The	general	order,	therefore,	did	mean	that	the	‘whole	of	the	blacks	in	the	country’	were	under	
martial	law.	Although	Queensland	had	not	ratified	that	order	by	due	process,	New	South	Wales	had.	
Draconian, anti-assembly regulations began with Governor Lachlan Macquarie as early as May 1816. 
Aborigines ‘were forbidden to carry weapons within one and a half kilometres of European habitations 
or	to	congregate	in	groups	of	more	than	six,	on	pain	of	being	shot	at.’52 In Tasmania, Governor Arthur 
empowered	 settlers	 to	 treat	 threatening	Aborigines	 as	 ‘open	 enemies’;	 in	 1828,	 he	 declared	 limited	
martial law to combat Aboriginal resistance, followed by total martial law in 1830.53
	 O’Connell	railed	at	the	injustice	of	the	policies	governing	the	Native	Police:	‘If	the	Native	Police	
are left to pursue a wholesale system of extermination and to keep the blacks from all contact with 
the	whites,	 [then]	you	may	protect	 the	 lives	of	 the	white	population,	but	 at	 a	great	 sacrifice—and	 I	
believe	an	unjust	sacrifice—of	the	lives	of	the	aborigines.’54	O’Connell’s	approach	had	two	flaws:	it	was	
contained in a Parliamentary Inquiry, and not part of a broader public protest, and he limited himself 
to the operations of the Native Police, rather than proclaiming general support for Aboriginal people. 
As	did	Charles	Lilley,	Maurice	O’Connell	saw	Native	Police	violence	and	frontier	conflict	as	failures	
in applying the rule of law, not as a social justice issue emanating from the illegal dispossession of 
Indigenous land.
 Charles Lilley, a foundation member of the QRA, was a Brisbane solicitor, a former editor of the 
Courier,	and	MLA	for	Brisbane’s	Fortitude	Valley.	He	was	later	Queensland’s	Premier,	then	Chief	Justice.	
He most famously attacked the reputation of the Native Police in an 1863 case involving Richard Miller. 
Miller	was	charged	with	assaulting	a	Native	Police	Officer,	William	Cave,	with	intent	to	prevent	the	
apprehension	of	an	Aboriginal	boy.	Lilley	cross-examined	Miller’s	boss,	the	station	owner	Mr.	Cameron.	
Cameron told the court that both he and Miller supposed Cave was going ‘as was the habit of NP 
49.	 	Ibid.,	562.
50.  The Courier, 29 August 1861: 2.
51.  The Courier,	24	July	1861:	3.
52.  Michael McKernan and Margaret Browne, eds., Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace (Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 
95.
53.  Ibid., 96.
54.	 	Select	committee	on	the	Native	Police	Force,	489.
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officers,	to	shoot	the	boy	Peter.’55	In	summing	up,	Lilley	stressed	that	Miller’s	actions	were	due	to	his	
impression	that	the	lad’s	life	was	in	danger.	The	jury	returned	almost	immediately	with	a	verdict	of	not	
guilty.
 Along with the Courier newspaper, and testimony from the two Parliamentary Committees, 
Lilley consolidated the reputation of the Native Police as a legalised hit squad. The 1861 Inquiry, itself, 
augmented	 the	 force’s	unsavoury	 reputation:	 the	 Inquiry	 found	proven	 instances	 of	 ‘indiscriminate	
slaughter	which	appears	on	more	than	one	occasion	to	have	taken	place.’56 No charges were ever laid.
	 In	later	years,	ex-members	of	the	Native	Police	sought	to	clear	its	name.	W.	R.	O.	Hill,	in	his	book,	
Forty-Five Years Experiences in North Queensland, exclaimed, ‘The old talk about dispersing the blacks, 
and wiping out tribes indiscriminately, is a fallacy, for I am in a position to assert that I never knew an 
officer	to	allow	a	shot	to	be	fired	unless	in	extreme	necessity,	and	then	only	when	the	blacks	were	caught	
red-handed.’57 In the next chapter, Hill contradicts himself. He describes ‘Vick, another good trooper … 
carrying	a	little	boy	about	four	years	of	age	whose	father	had	been	deservedly	shot	…	I	was	horrified	
to	 see	Vick	 ride	up	 to	a	 tree	and	knock	 the	 little	 chap’s	brains	out!	…	Vick	got	 a	flogging	he	never	
forgot.’58
 Vick was never charged for the murder of the child. In comparison, consider bushranger Thomas 
Jeffries and his gang who killed six Europeans in a rum-fuelled rampage in northern Tasmania in 
January	1826.	The	death	that	attracted	the	most	condemnation	was	Mrs.	Tibbs’s	five-month	old	child.	
Jeffries	took	the	infant	‘and	dashed	out	its	brains	on	a	tree-trunk.’59	Jeffries,	‘the	monster’	who	had	eaten	
the	flesh	of	another	victim,	was	captured,	charged,	found	guilty,	and	hung.
 Colonists believed the law should protect as well as punish them, and ignored the fact that 
Aborigines were punished, rarely protected. Queensland juries would often add insult to injury by 
acquitting whites of crimes committed against blacks. In February 1873, Robert Dunsmore appeared in 
the Toowoomba Circuit court. He admitted murdering the Aborigine Thurragai Jack, and said, ‘Served 
him	right	…	I	saw	I	had	gone	too	far	but	 it	was	no	use	crying	over	spilt	milk.’	The	 jury	delivered	a	
verdict of not guilty and the prisoner was discharged.60
	 The	Native	Police	reports	were	kept	to	a	minimum;	Native	Police	officers	learned	not	to	have	a	
European	witness	with	them	on	patrol:	 ‘I	never	take	any	white	people	with	me’	admitted	Wheeler.61 
Accountability was a by-product of public interest or media scrutiny, rather than procedural intervention. 
The administrative failures facilitated Native Police crimes and shielded members from prosecution. 
Although contemporaries continued to question the paramilitary activities of the Native Police, and to 
condemn its violence, the Queensland government failed to restrain its activities. 
	 The	most	 conspicuous	 reason	 for	 the	 government’s	 failure	was	money.	 Queensland’s	Native	
Police	fought	on	the	frontier	at	an	average	of	£10,000	per	annum.	When	Maurice	O’Connell	proposed	a	
reconstructed	force,	his	budget	quadrupled	that	amount,	with	annual	salaries	alone	costing	£16,446	7s	
6d.62	O’Connell’s	plan	was	doomed	since	Native	troopers	were	paid	a	quarter	of	the	European	wage.	
It	was	a	foregone	conclusion	the	Committee	would	find	against	‘the	substitution	of	white	troopers	for	
native.’	The	frontier	war	might	have	been	economic,	but	first	and	foremost	it	was	a	war	of	economy,	the	
cheap option, and a war of investment, a futures option. As British historian Neil Faulkner described 
the Roman invasion of Britain, ‘It was expected to return a reward in plundered wealth, which in the 
long run at least, not only paid for the war, but made the warmonger richer and stronger. The lower the 
level of economic and social development, the more marginal were the gains, and the more problematic 
55.  The Courier, 21 April 1863: 3.
56.  The Courier,	24	July	1861:	2.
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59.  Hobart Town Gazette, 28 January 1826: 2.
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the	military	effort.’63 Aboriginal Australia made a virtue of nomadic subsistence; cities paved with gold 
were not their style. Consequently, expenditure on the frontier war was always minimal.
	 When	the	Courier announced in 1879 that ‘we are today at war with every tribe of wild blacks 
on the frontiers of settlement, and the gain to the community, judging from numerous complaints that 
reach us from the North, is not commensurate with the expense of maintaining the force of native 
troopers,’64 it was the exasperated cry of a reformist newspaper unable to make Parliament commit to 
reform. Squatter interests dominated Parliament, especially the Legislative Council. The landed elite 
pursued their own interests consistently and shamelessly. Since the Native Police performed at the beck 
and	call	of	squatters,	the	Legislative	Council	was	wary	of	interfering	with	the	force.	O’Connell,	station	
owner and President of the Legislative Council, was at odds with his own, both in his wish to upgrade 
the Native Police, and to establish a viable volunteer force.
	 Parliament	 initially	 voted	 £3,000	 for	 the	 volunteers’	 arms.	After	 the	 1861	 Inquiry,	 Parliament	
starved the volunteers of funds for a decade. From 1860–1870, the total Queensland defence vote was 
£9,048	1s	8p.65 The Native Police received more in a year. The QRA received no government assistance, 
instead relying on subscriptions of a guinea per member per annum, and donations from supporters.
	 Debate	over	the	reality	of	the	frontier	‘war’	stretches	back	150	years,	with	recent	interest	coloured	
by Australian nationalism. The bullish nationalism of the 1970s painted colonialism with a wide stripe 
of	anti-British	sentiment.	‘Blaming	the	British’	linked	frontier	conflict	with	Gallipoli	and	the	fall	of	Singa-
pore, a triumvirate of defence débâcles from which Australia sought to assert an independent national 
voice.	However,	attempts	to	blame	frontier	violence	entirely	on	British	colonialism	must	founder.	While	
the provision of external colonial defence certainly illustrates an overwhelming dependence on the 
‘Mother	Country,’	internal	defence	was	a	colonial	responsibility.	Queensland	was	no	exception.	Britain	
supplied	Queensland’s	Native	Police	and	Volunteers	with	guns	and	ammunition,	but	local	authorities	
made	the	final	decision	about	who	used	the	weapons,	and	who	they	were	used	against,	or	not.
	 Maurice	 O’Connell’s	 choice	 that	 the	 Queensland	 Volunteers	 would	 not	 bear	 arms	 against	
Aborigines	 belies	 the	 so-called	 ‘inevitability’	 of	 conflict.	 ‘Shooting	 blacks	 is	 one	 of	 the	 common	
accessories	 of	 bush	 life	 all	 over	Queensland,’	wrote	 a	 Charters	 Towers	 resident	 in	 1883.	 ‘It	 is	 the	
inevitable	consequence	of	our	possession	of	the	land.’66 Inevitability had found sustenance in Social 
Darwinism and the doctrine of manifest destiny, two populist notions that many Queenslanders 
found	particularly	attractive.	The	phrase	‘survival	of	the	fittest’	even	sold	beer	for	Brisbane’s	West	
End Brewery.67	 	While	 Darwinian	 theories	 and	manifest	 destiny	 seemed	 to	 provide	 retrospective	
absolution for frontier violence, those views always had opponents. On Christmas Day 1882, a Courier 
book	reviewer	pilloried	Miss	Anna	Buckley’s	social	Darwinist	 tract,	Winners in Life’s Races, ending 
with an elegant coup de grâce: ‘It is the triumph of civilisation to correct in some degree the inequalities 
of	nature	and	to	protect	the	weak	against	the	strong.’68
	 O’Connell’s	choice	reaffirmed	the	frontier	as	a	place	where	negotiation	and	cooperation	could	
and	did	occur.	In	1861,	the	Chairman	of	the	Wide	Bay	Cotton	Growing	Association	praised	‘the	blacks	
[who]	in	various	numbers	have	been	continually	occupied.	Had	it	not	been	for	the	aborigines,	the	work	
already	done	could	not	have	been	done	with	our	limited	means.’69 In 1858, grazier Alfred Brown noted, 
‘The	blacks	whom	we	employ	as	shepherds	and	stockmen	…	are	very	useful	to	us	and	very	beneficial	
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64.	 	The Brisbane Courier, 18 February 1879: 2.
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to	the	country.’70	O’Connell	himself	spoke	of	a	property	on	the	Burnett	where	Aboriginal	shepherds	had	
charge of nearly 16,000 sheep.71
	 That	 a	 penny-pinching	 Parliament	 facilitated	 violence	 on	Queensland’s	 frontier	 seems	 oddly	
prosaic amid larger debates about colonialism, dispossession and racism. It is the commonplace, every-
day aspect of the stinginess that makes it so chilling. The parsimony had a purpose—Parliament wanted 
to create infrastructure—but the honourable members knew building railways would reduce protection 
of	Aboriginal	people.	That	fact	is	to	the	lasting	discredit	of	Queensland’s	colonial	Parliament.72 
70.  Select committee on the murders by the Aborigines on the Dawson River, 889.
71.	 	Select	committee	on	the	Native	Police	Force,	490.
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